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Among the many aspects that characterize the COVID-19 pandemic, two seem particularly chal-
lenging to understand: i), the great geographical differences in the degree of virus contagiousness
and lethality which were found in the different phases of the epidemic progression, and, ii), the po-
tential role of the infected people’s blood type in both the virus infectivity and the progression of the
disease. Recently, Breiman et al. [1] presented a hypothesis that could shed some light on i) and ii),
specifically, it has been proposed that during the subject-to-subject transfer SARS-CoV-2 conserves
on its capsid the erythrocytes’ antigens of the source subject, causing a potential immune reaction in
a receiving subject which has previously acquired specific antibodies to the source subject antigens.
This implies a blood type-dependent infection rate. The strong geographical dependence of the
blood type distribution could be, therefore, one of the factors at the origin of i). Here we present
an epidemiological deterministic model where the infection rules hypothesized in [1] are taken into
account. The comparison of the model outcome with exiting worldwide infection progression data
seems to support the Breiman et al. hypothesis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The new infectious coronavirus disease 2019, called
COVID-19, began to spread from China in December
2019 [2]. The most evident COVID-19 symptoms are
pneumonia and respiratory failure, which reiterate the
symptoms reported in the SARS (Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome) epidemic of 2003 [3, 4]. The first clus-
ter to clearly show these symptoms were patients from
Wuhan, People’s Republic of China (WMHC) [3]. In
early January 2020, scientists at the National Institute
of Viral Disease Control and Prevention (IVDC) isolated
the new virus for the first time from patients in Wuhan
and found it to be a novel β-genus coronavirus, which has
been named SARS-CoV-2 [5]. Currently, the outbreak
has rapidly spread in many other countries. Hence, on
11 March 2020, the World Health Organization declared
it a pandemic [6]. It clearly represents a global threat to
public health [7].
Understanding the transmission dynamics of this infec-
tion plays a key role in assessing the transmission poten-
tial that may be sustained in the future. In this context,
models and simulations represent a powerful tool, which
can be useful to study and monitor human and animal
viral infections [8, 9]. These tools have become funda-
mental, especially during this pandemic, to evaluate the
trade-off between cost and effectiveness of various social
distancing strategies, and to enable policymakers to make
the best decisions in the interest of the public health [10].
Nonetheless, each disease is characterized by its spe-
cific biological rules, therefore it is essential to consider
them in a mathematical model in order to describe real
situations. As the virus spreads across the world the pan-
demic has presented a similar pattern, in all the countries
that recorded a significant number of infections. The pat-
tern is made up of a first phase that is characterized by
an exponential increase of infections and a later phase in
which the implementation of social distancing measures
reduces the spread of the disease to a sub-exponential
growth, which generally is followed by a gradual decrease
of daily infections. Eventually, the gradual decrease in
the number of daily infections becomes smaller than the
daily recovered number, thus the number of the total in-
fected starts decreasing.
Even if this general pattern has been reproduced
around the world, the spread of the virus showed im-
portant local differences, mostly in the rate of the initial
exponential spread. Given the unrepeatable nature of
this historic event, it is extremely difficult to understand
if these patterns are the consequence of geographical in-
homogeneities or if these are spurious correlations which
are caused by the singularity of the observed event.
Indeed, some works underlined as in the early stage
of the epidemics the virus showed a geographical pattern
with most of the infection localized in temperate regions
characterized by specific characteristics of temperature
and humidity [11–14].
Furthermore, in the specific context of Italy, a non-
negligible difference in the rate of infection and mortal-
ity between the Northern and Southern regions was re-
ported. But most analyses considered these differences
as the effect of the implementation of social distancing
rules before that the disease spread in South Italy and
not of climate variables [15].
Other potential co-morbidities that may explain local
patterns are hypertension, obesity, and age distribution,
which are known to display heterogeneous local distribu-
tions [16, 17].
Recently, Zhao et al. [18] found that ABO blood groups
presented a different risk to contract COVID-19 as a
result of being exposed to SARS-CoV-2. Previously,
for the similar coronavirus SARS-CoV responsible for
SARS, Guillon et al. [19] showed experimentally that
for SARS-CoV synthesized by cells that expressed the
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2A histo-blood group antigen, the interaction between
S protein and its membrane receptor, ACE2, could be
blocked by anti-A blood group antibodies. Starting
from these experimental results regarding the SARS-CoV
spike, Breiman et al. [1] extend the hypothesis to the new
SARS-CoV-2, suggesting that the different susceptibility
of individuals with different ABO blood groups may have
the same explanation. This new hypothesis, based on the
infection rules schematically illustrated in Figure 1, may
explain a part of the variability in the infection conta-
giousness among the countries of the world [1].
Here, we discuss the spread of the epidemic from a
mathematical modeling perspective, taking into account
the influence of the different sub-populations divided ac-
cording to the two most important blood group systems,
i.e ABO and Rh, in the different geographical areas. The
main purpose of this work is to verify whether the hy-
pothesized blood group based infection rules can be con-
sistent with the acquired country-level data on blood
group distribution and infection diffusion dynamics.
In the last decades, the modeling of epidemic diffusion
behaviors has rapidly developed and found wide applica-
tion [20]. Many recent papers described different aspects
of the COVID-19 disease evolution through mathemat-
ical models [21–28]. We propose here a generalization
of the widely-used Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model
(SIR), a simple compartmental model, where the popula-
tion is divided into three sets. “Susceptible” are healthy
individuals who can be infected by other individuals. “In-
fected” individuals are those who contracted the virus at
time t, while “Recovered” consists of all the immune in-
dividuals, therefore they cannot be infected again. Each
of these compartments is time-dependent, owing to the
progressive nature of the disease. If we take a determin-
istic system, we can model the epidemic process using
ordinary differential equations. Consequently, the state
of each compartment, at any time of the evolution of the
system, is completely determined by the initial conditions
along with the differential equations [29].
Here, we modified the SIR model to take into account
the proposed blood type infection rules with the aim of
testing the working hypothesis against real data.
II. MODELS
In this section we first briefly consider the standard
SIR model for the time evolution of the fraction of sus-
ceptible (x(t)), infected (y(t)) and recovered (z(t)) people
in a population of size N , recalling the main features of
the model and its solution.
We then analyze in detail the generalization of the SIR
model to a more complex pattern of infection, as the one
described in the previous section.
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FIG. 1: Scheme of the proposed infection rules according to
Rh blood types and ABO ones. Full line connection indicated
the possibility of infection, Wij = 1, while dotted connection
its impossibility. In the Rh infection system, individuals of
the same group can infect each other, people with the Rh-
group can transmit the infection to people with Rh+ one,
but not viceversa. The scenario of the ABO system is similar
although richer. For instance, 0 type can infect the A type,
while the opposite is not possible.
A. Standard SIR model
The standard SIR model reads
dx(t)
dt = −β x(t) y(t) (1)
dy(t)
dt = β x(t) y(t)− γ y(t) (2)
dz(t)
dt = γ y(t) (3)
where the three functions satisfy the relation
x(t) + y(t) + z(t) = 1 (4)
and the parameter β and γ represent the infection and
recovery rate respectively.
We introduce the parameter ρ
.
= γ/β and the re-scaled
time τ
.
= βt. We thus chose the simple and realistic
case of a few infected persons at time zero, and all the
remaining population susceptible of infection:
x(0) = xo
y(0) = yo = 1− xo (5)
z(0) = 0.
The solution of the standard SIR model that obey
these initial conditions can be written as:
x(τ) = xo e
−z(τ)/ρ (6)
y(τ) = 1− z(τ)− xo e−z(τ)/ρ (7)
τ =
1
ρ
∫ z(τ)
0
dζ
1− ζ − xoe−ζ/ρ . (8)
31. Short time expansion
It is well know that the onset of the infection is well
represented by an exponential growth. It is therefore
useful to perform the expansion of the solutions (6), (7)
and (8) for τ → 0.
In the small τ limit, the expression for τ(z) given by
Eq. (8), becomes:
τ(z) ≈ τ |z=0 + dτ
dz
∣∣∣
z=0
z =
1
ρ
z
(1− xo) ,
thus
z(τ) ≈ ρ(1− xo)τ = ρyoτ. (9)
By substituting in (6) and (7), we get
x(τ) ≈ xo e−yoτ (10)
y(τ) ≈ 1− ρyoτ − xo e−yoτ . (11)
The last equation, by expanding the exponential, col-
lecting the terms linear in τ and resuming the exponen-
tial, becomes:
y(τ) ≈ yo e(xo−ρ)τ (12)
which represents the desired exponential growth of the
infection at short time. As at short time the fraction of
infected population is very small (i.e. yo  1), we can
safely approximate xo ≈ 1:
y(τ) ≈ yo e(1−ρ)τ . (13)
Equation (13) expresses one of the key concepts of
epidemic models. The number of infectious individuals
grows exponentially if ρ < 1, or β > γ. Often, in the
literature, the parameter controlling the level of infec-
tion growth is the “reproduction number”, Ro, defined
as the average number of secondary infections caused by
a primary case introduced in a fully susceptible popu-
lation [30]. Ro is therefore equal to β/γ, which, in our
notation, means Ro = 1/ρ.
From those simple considerations arises the concept of
epidemic threshold: only if (1 − ρ) > 0, thus R0 > 1
(i.e. if a single infected individual generates on average
more than one secondary infection), an infective agent
can cause an outbreak. If R0 < 1 (i.e. if a single infected
individual generates less than one secondary infection),
then (1− ρ) < 0 and the onset of the epidemy is charac-
terized by a decreasing number of cases.
2. Summary of standard SIR properties
In this subsection, we recollect the main results from
Sections II A 1. The main results are four. First, it is
worth to always perform the limit xo → 1, while keep-
ing yo 6= 0 as discussed below. This allows us to cor-
rectly capture the exponential growth that characterizes
the initial phase of an epidemic.
Second,the exact solutions of the standard SIR model
wit the initial conditions (5) are:
x(τ) = e−z(τ)/ρ
y(τ) = 1− z(τ)− ez(τ)/ρ.
τ =
1
ρ
∫ z(τ)
0
dζ
1− ζ − e−ζ/ρ
Third, the value of maximum infection is found to be:
yM = 1− ρ+ ρ log(ρ).
Fourth, at short time, when the exponential growth
dominate the solution, the following approximations
hold:
x(τ) = e−yoτ
y(τ) = yo e
(1−ρ)τ (14)
z(τ) = ρyoτ
As last observation, it is worth to emphasize that
Eq. (14) is identical to the short time expansion of the
infectivity in the SIS (Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible)
model, which is a simplified version of the SIR model
where individuals never acquire immunity to the infec-
tion. The latter, at short time, reads:
y˙(τ) = xoy(τ)− ρy(τ) (15)
whose solution coincides with Eq. (12)) or, after the
xo = 1 approximation, with Eq. (13)).
B. Generalized SIR model
Our aim is to generalize the SIR model to the case
where the population is not homogeneous, but it is com-
posed of different sub-populations that follow specific in-
fection rules.
In the general case of k sub-populations i = 1, ..., k ,
the time evolution of the variables can be written as:
x˙i = −xi
k∑
j=1
Wijyj (16)
y˙i = xi
k∑
j=1
Wijyj − ρ yi (17)
z˙i = ρ yi (18)
where the matrix W encodes the infection rules.
As an example, we discuss the simple case of only two
sub-populations that could follow the infection rules as-
sociated to the Rh± blood type (f1 ≡ f−, f2 ≡ f+, where
4f± is the frequency of one blood type in the population).
The sub-population with Rh+, according to the working
hypothesis, cannot infect the Rh− one. On the other
hand, the Rh− sub-population can infect both Rh− and
Rh+ sub-populations. The matrix W(2) in this situation
turns out to be:
W(2) =
(
1 0
1 1
)
(19)
The corresponding SIR equations, to our knowledge,
cannot be solved by quadrature. The numerical solution
for this k = 2 case is also depicted in Figure 2, where as
an example the fraction of infected people yi(τ) for the
two sub-populations (green dashed and red dotted lines)
and the total fraction yT (τ) of infected people (blue line)
are reported as a function of the reduced time τ for the
case ρ = 0.1 and f1 = 0.4, f2 = 0.6.
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FIG. 2: Example of numerical solution of the generalised SIR
model for two sub-populations (k = 2) and for the infectivity
matrix of Eq. (19). The reported example is for ρ = 0.1,
f1 = 0.4 and f2 = 0.6. The dashed and red lines represent
the fraction of infected people in the two sub-populations, the
blue line the total fraction of infected persons, the horizontal
dotted line indicates the maximum value, yM , of yT (τ) in the
case of all-infect-all rule. The inset report the maximum of
yT (τ) as a function of f1 (f2 = 1−f1) for three distinct values
of ρ.
One can immediately notice that the maximum frac-
tion of infected people, yM , is reduced with respect
to the one-population case (horizontal dash-dotted blue
line). This is a trivial consequence of the impossibility
of Rh+ to infect Rh-, thus reducing the “effective” infec-
tion rate. The dependence of the maximum infectivity
on f1 (f2 = 1 − f1) is reported in the inset of Figure 2
for three representative values of ρ (ρ=0.1, 0.3 and 0.5).
Noteworthy, for the case ρ=0.5, i.e. R0=2, the actual
value observed in Europe, the maximum of infectivity is
reduced from the all-infect-all case (≈0.2) to a value more
than ten times smaller (≈0.01) when f1 approach 0.5.
The immediate consequence of this finding is that the
time evolution of the epidemic strongly depends on the
blood type distribution, giving a qualitative explanation
of the observed high geographical variability: even a
small change in f1/f2 highly affects both the infectivity
maximum and the infectivity growth rate in the initial
exponential growth phase.
If we consider the effects of the ABO types only, and
we neglect the Rh± blood difference, we have four sub-
populations with the corresponding frequencies: f1 ≡ f0,
f2 ≡ fA, f3 ≡ fB , f4 ≡ fAB). With the infection rules
summarised in Figure 1 the W(4) matrix results:
W(4) =
(
W(2) 0
W(2) W(2)
)
(20)
Finally, in the case where both the ABO and the Rh
types play a role, there are eight subpopulations with
respective frequencies fO− ≡ f1, fA− ≡ f2, fB− ≡ f3,
fAB− ≡ f4, fO+ ≡ f5, fA+ ≡ f6, fB+ ≡ f7, fAB+ ≡ f8,
and the corresponding matrix W(8) reads:
W(8) =
(
W(4) 0
W(4) W(4)
)
(21)
The recursive structure of Eqs. (19 - 21) has a sim-
ple explanation, that can be better understood if we
think of the ABO blood type system as the combina-
tion of two codominant and one recessive allele that form
two independent systems. Let’s specify if a person does
have (“+”) or does not have (“−”) the antigen A (A+
or A− respectively), analogously for the antigen B (B+
or B−). Then the usual blood type is: 0 ≡ [A−,B−];
A ≡ [A+,B−]; B ≡ [A−,B+]; AB ≡ [A+,B+]. With
this notation it is clear that the “ABO” system (which
follows W (4)) is the product of the “A” system (which
follows W (2)) and the “B” system (which again follows
W (2)): ABO=A± × B±. Furthermore, by multiplying
the ABO system by the Rh± system we get the ABO
× Rh± = A± × B± × Rh± system, which obeys the
W (8) infection rules. Summing up, any time it exists a
set of antigens, Ai, i = 1..a, that can be either present
or absent, the infection rule of the A1 × A2 ×.... × Aa
system follows the W (k) infection rule with k = 2a.
The set of 3k differential equations (16 - 18), together
with the initial conditions:
xi(0) = fixo ≈ fi
yi(0) = fiyo (22)
zi(0) = 0
and the sum rule
k∑
i=1
fi = 1 (23)
allows one to work out the short time expansion for the
infected person fraction on each of the k sub-populations:
yi(τ) = yofi e
pi
(k)
i τ i = 1, ..., k (24)
5with
pi
(k)
i =
∑
j
Wijfj − ρ = (W · f¯)i − ρ .= p(k)i − ρ, (25)
as well as the total number of infected persons:
yT (τ) =
∑
i
yi(τ) = yo e
pi
(k)
T τ i = 1, ..., k (26)
with
pi
(k)
T =
∑
i
∑
j
fiWijfj−ρ = f¯ ·W · f¯−ρ .= p(k)T −ρ (27)
which implicitly define p
(k)
i and p
(k)
T . This simple expres-
sion for the inverse of the characteristic time of the infec-
tion at its onset is the sum of two terms: , pi
(k)
T = p
(k)
T −ρ.
The first one,
p
(k)
T
.
= f¯ ·W · f¯ (28)
depends only on the abundance of the sub-population
(f¯) and on the infection rules (W), the second (ρ = γ/β)
on the overall recovery and infection rates of populations.
To study the global effect of the population composi-
tion on the progression of the infection, we concentrate
on the term p
(k)
T which acts as a “susceptibility”.
It is worth to note that, for any k, the susceptibil-
ity is maximum when f¯ = (0...0, 1, 0, ...0), p
(k)
T = 1,
i.e. when one sub-population fraction dominates, while it
minimum when the sub-populations are all of the same
size: f¯ = (1/k, 1/k...1/k). In the latter case, for the
infection rules reported before, p
(k)
T = (3/4)
(k/2). Thus
the susceptibility decreases on increasing the number of
sub-populations and decreases on equalizing their abun-
dances.
Infection rules and compositions of the population are
expected to shape the infection dynamics along with the
usual infection and recovering rates.
In the following we will analyze some datasets of indi-
viduals infected by SARS-CoV-2, stratified by ABO and
AB0×Rh blood types. Then, we will deal with the con-
tagion curves of a large set of countries and try to assess
whether the present model could represent the real out-
come of the COVID-19 pandemics.
Specifically, we will first compare data collected in the
Chinese regions of Wuhan and Shenzhen reported in [18],
in the Ankara region (Turkey) [31], and in New York
City (NY, USA) [32], where the ABO type of sets of
infected people have been determined (AB0×Rh in the
New York City case). This allows for a direct comparison
between our model predictions and real data. Then we
move to analyze the early stages of the infection in differ-
ent countries at a worldwide level. To take into account
differences like lifestyle, climate, geographic location, and
other factors that likely influence the epidemics rates as
well, we identified four major areas, i.e. Europe, Asia,
Africa, and South America.
III. MATERIALS AND METHODS
A. Cases where infection data are stratified by
blood type
1. Wuhan/Shenzhen case
The first analysis of this work is carried out on the
data from [18], which reports the abundance of each ABO
blood group on the local population and the Covid-19
patients. These data are schematically reported in Ta-
ble I for three sub-cases (two Wuhan hospitals and one
Shenzhen hospital). The number of patients in the three
sub-cases are 1775, 113, and 285, respectively.
TABLE I: Data from reference [18] used to determine the
quantities plotted in Figure 3: ln(di/fi) and p
(4)
T following
Eq. (25), with di being the fractions of infected having blood
group i, fi is the fraction of population with blood group i and
p
(4)
T represent the susceptibility of the population to become
infected.
Dataset Quantity 0 A B AB
Wuhan 1 fi 0.3384 0.3216 0.2490 0.0910
di 0.2580 0.3775 0.2642 0.1003
Wuhan 2 fi 0.3384 0.3216 0.2490 0.0910
di 0.2478 0.3982 0.2212 0.1330
Shenzhen fi 0.3877 0.2877 0.2511 0.0742
di 0.2842 0.2877 0.2912 0.1368
2. Anakara case
Further data stratified by ABO blood groups are re-
ported in [31] for 186 patients with a confirmed diagno-
sis of COVID-19 in the region of Ankara. The fraction
of infected, di for each ABO blood group are reported
in Table II, together with the frequencies of the groups
in a control sample of 1881 healthy individuals, whose
blood groups were collected in the same period of time
of the 186 infected cases. The reduced size of the sample
assures statistical confidence only for A and O groups
(p-value < 0.05), with AB being the less trust-wort with
a p-value of 0.364 (see [31]).
TABLE II: Data from reference [31] used to determine the
quantities plotted in Figure 4: ln(di/fi) and p
(4)
T following
Eq. (25), with di being the fractions of infected having blood
group i, fi is the fraction of population with blood group i and
p
(4)
T represent the susceptibility of the population to become
infected.
Quantity O A B AB
fi 0.3725 0.3804 0.1473 0.0998
di 0.2473 0.5699 0.1075 0.0753
63. New York City case
The previous cases provided data of infected individ-
uals stratified by ABO groups, i.e. no further division
by Rhesus groups was reported. A recent work by Zi-
etz et al. [32], collected information of both ABO and
Rh± groups for 682 infected individuals tested in New
York Presbyterian/Columbia University Irving Medical
Center (NYP/CUIMC). We summarized the information
relevant for our analysis in Table III. Due to both the rel-
atively small size of the sample and the lower frequencies
of Rh-negative blood groups in the local population, data
for Rh-negative groups are affected by a higher statistical
error with respect to Rh-positive one. In particular, no
infected individuals with group AB- were found by [32].
Thus, we restricted our analyses to only seven groups
(i.e. O+,O−, A+,A−,B+,B−, AB+).
TABLE III: Data from reference [32] used to determine the
quantities plotted in Figure 5: ln(di/fi) and p
(8)
T following
Eq. (25), with di being the fractions of infected having blood
group i, fi is the fraction of population with blood group i and
p
(8)
T represent the susceptibility of the population to become
infected considering both ABO and Rh infection rules.
Quantity O+ A+ B+ AB+ O- A- B- AB-
fi 0.437 0.296 0.136 0.038 0.044 0.032 0.013 0.004
di 0.427 0.317 0.160 0.031 0.031 0.025 0.010 –
4. Data Analysis
Once we have collected the availaible data on the num-
ber of infected people stratified by blood type, di, in a
geographical area where the blood type distribution, fi,
is known we perform the comparison of these data with
the model. According to Eqs. (24) and (27) we expect
that
di = yofi e
(p
(k)
i −ρ)τ∗ i = 1..k (29)
with p
(k)
i = (W · f¯)i and τ∗ the specific (reduced) time
when the data have been collected. Therefore
ln(di/fi) = K + p
(k)
i τ
∗ i = 1..k (30)
being K a constant (K = ln yo − ρτ∗) not depending on
i. We thus expect a linear relation between ln(di/fi) and
p
(k)
i . The error bars on ln(di/fi) are one standard devia-
tion calculated by assuming a Poissonian distribution for
the number of cases, thus ∆(ln(di/fi)) = 1/
√
ni being
ni the number of infected persons with blood type i.
B. Cases where infection data are not stratified by
blood type
To our knowledge, the only studies reporting the blood
type stratification of the infection data are discussed be-
low. To make further tests on the blood type constrained
infection rules proposed in [1], we have to abandon p
(k)
i
(the susceptibility per group) and focus on pkT (the to-
tal susceptibility), for which a large amount of data is
available.
1. The countries case
The incidence of the different blood types in different
nations can be found in Wikipedia [33], where a collection
of data and the original sources references are reported.
These frequencies f are also listed in Table IV, together
with the country ISO code.
From these data we can calculate p
(2)
T (keeping into
account only the Rh± type), p(4)T (keeping into account
only the ABO type) and p
(8)
T (keeping into account both
the Rh± and the ABO types) according to Eq. (27) for
each country. To estimate the uncertainty on p
(k)
T , we
observe that the f are reported with three significant
digits. We therefore associate to each f (which value is
of the order of one) an error equal to ∆f = 10−3, and
we estimate the upper limit of the error on p
(k)
T , which is
bi-linear in f , as ∆p
(k)
T ≈ 2
√
k∆f .
The data of the contagion by country is taken from
World Health Organization (WHO) Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) Dashboard on date 12th of June 2020 [34].
To ensure statistical reliability, we selected only countries
that had registered at least 2000 positive cases from the
start of the epidemic. Requiring also to know the fre-
quencies of both ABO and Rh±, we ended up with 78
countries, whose information is reported in Table IV.
In particular, the WHO data reports the number of
new infections per day, D˙(t). From this quantity, we
easily obtain the cumulative number of people that have
been infected as a function of time, D(t) =
∫ t
o
D˙(t′)dt′.
The cumulative, rather than directly with D˙(t) allows
us to work on cleaner and more solid data, because the
day-by-day fluctuations are averaged out in the long run.
Coming back to the model, at short times the cumulative
DT (τ) is directly related to yT (τ), which short-time ex-
pansion is reported in Eq. (26). Overall, the COVID19
infection is characterized by low mortality but a high
infectivity rate together with both long incubation and
recovery periods. These conditions assure that limiting
our analysis to the early stages of the infection, the cu-
mulative can be regarded as a good proxy for the number
of infected.
For each country reported in Table IV, we manually se-
lected the time interval corresponding to the onset of the
infection. In that range, we performed an unsupervised
fit using the function:
Y (t) =
{
m0t if t < t0
m0t0 +A
(
em(t−t0) − 1) if t > t0 (31)
7TABLE IV: Percentages of blood groups (fi) as reported in [33], susceptibility, p
(k)
T as given by Eq. (27), and inverse char-
acteristic time, m, of the exponential phase of the infection for the analysed countries as derived for the fit to the observed
data.
Country Cluster Code O+ A+ B+ AB+ O− A− B− AB− p
(2)
T p
(4)
T p
(8)
T m ∆m R
2
Argentina SA AR 45.40 34.26 8.59 2.64 8.40 0.44 0.21 0.06 0.917 0.679 0.635 0.196 0.011 0.98
Armenia AS AM 29.00 46.30 12.00 5.60 2.00 3.70 1.00 0.40 0.934 0.618 0.577 0.143 0.025 0.97
Australia AU AU 40.00 31.00 8.00 2.00 9.00 7.00 2.00 1.00 0.846 0.660 0.556 0.223 0.005 0.99
Austria EU AT 30.00 37.00 12.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 2.00 1.00 0.866 0.612 0.530 0.216 0.033 0.98
Bahrain AS BH 48.48 19.35 22.61 3.67 3.27 1.33 1.04 0.25 0.945 0.635 0.600 0.356 0.054 0.97
Bangladesh AS BD 29.45 26.01 33.66 8.29 0.95 0.67 0.70 0.27 0.975 0.553 0.539 0.245 0.008 1.00
Belgium EU BE 38.00 34.00 8.60 4.10 7.00 6.00 1.50 0.80 0.870 0.647 0.564 0.209 0.019 0.99
Bolivia SA BO 51.53 29.45 10.11 1.15 4.39 2.73 0.54 0.10 0.928 0.680 0.631 0.148 0.012 0.95
Bosnia and Herzegovina EU BA 31.00 36.00 12.00 6.00 5.00 7.00 2.00 1.00 0.872 0.609 0.530 0.152 0.010 0.99
Brazil SA BR 36.00 34.00 8.00 2.50 9.00 8.00 2.00 0.50 0.843 0.653 0.552 0.272 0.015 0.98
Bulgaria EU BG 28.00 37.00 13.00 7.00 5.00 7.00 2.00 1.00 0.872 0.600 0.524 0.063 0.038 0.97
Cameroon AF CM 42.80 38.80 12.00 3.30 1.40 1.20 0.40 0.10 0.970 0.636 0.617 0.400 0.059 0.95
Canada NA CA 39.00 36.00 7.60 2.50 7.00 6.00 1.40 0.50 0.873 0.661 0.578 0.250 0.016 0.96
Chile SA CL 85.50 8.70 3.35 1.00 1.20 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.986 0.877 0.865 0.411 0.034 0.97
China AS CN 47.70 27.80 18.90 5.00 0.28 0.19 0.10 0.03 0.994 0.620 0.617 0.419 0.069 1.00
Colombia SA CO 61.30 26.11 2.28 1.47 5.13 2.70 0.70 0.31 0.919 0.754 0.692 0.218 0.015 0.97
Croatia EU HR 29.00 36.00 15.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 1.00 0.872 0.588 0.513 0.159 0.017 0.99
Cuba SA CU 45.80 33.50 10.20 2.90 3.60 2.80 1.00 0.20 0.930 0.654 0.608 0.220 0.020 0.95
Czechia EU CZ 27.00 36.00 15.00 7.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 1.00 0.872 0.583 0.511 0.287 0.029 0.98
Congo AF CD 59.50 21.30 15.20 2.40 1.00 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.984 0.685 0.674 0.123 0.010 0.99
Denmark EU DK 35.00 37.00 8.00 4.00 6.00 7.00 2.00 1.00 0.866 0.643 0.555 0.320 0.049 0.99
Dominican Republic SA DO 46.20 26.40 16.90 3.10 3.70 2.10 1.40 0.20 0.931 0.630 0.587 0.295 0.047 0.94
Ecuador SA EC 75.00 14.00 7.10 0.50 2.38 0.70 0.30 0.02 0.967 0.802 0.775 0.471 0.028 0.99
Egypt AF EG 52.00 24.00 12.40 3.80 5.00 2.00 0.60 0.20 0.928 0.672 0.625 0.158 0.029 0.97
El Salvador SA SV 62.00 23.00 11.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.30 0.971 0.706 0.683 0.148 0.007 0.98
Ethiopia AF ET 39.00 28.00 21.00 5.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.935 0.593 0.553 0.087 0.002 1.00
Finland EU FI 28.00 35.00 16.00 7.00 5.00 6.00 2.00 1.00 0.880 0.584 0.515 0.127 0.007 0.98
France EU FR 36.00 37.00 9.00 3.00 6.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 0.872 0.647 0.561 0.251 0.007 0.99
Germany EU DE 35.00 37.00 9.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 2.00 1.00 0.872 0.637 0.555 0.230 0.022 0.99
Ghana AF GH 53.80 17.60 18.30 2.80 4.50 1.30 1.30 0.20 0.928 0.668 0.624 0.091 0.013 0.98
Greece EU GR 37.40 32.90 11.00 3.70 7.00 5.00 2.00 1.00 0.872 0.631 0.551 0.282 0.063 0.94
Guinea AF GN 46.88 21.64 22.86 4.52 2.00 0.90 1.00 0.20 0.961 0.621 0.596 0.094 0.005 0.99
Honduras SA HN 57.50 27.00 7.80 2.50 2.70 1.70 0.60 0.20 0.951 0.702 0.666 0.128 0.015 0.98
Hungary EU HU 27.00 33.00 16.00 8.00 5.00 7.00 3.00 1.00 0.866 0.577 0.500 0.132 0.006 1.00
India AS IN 27.85 20.80 38.14 8.93 1.43 0.57 1.79 0.49 0.959 0.565 0.541 0.191 0.005 1.00
Indonesia AS ID 36.82 25.87 28.85 7.96 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.995 0.572 0.569 0.292 0.044 0.97
Iran AS IR 33.50 27.00 22.20 7.00 4.00 3.00 2.50 0.80 0.908 0.575 0.522 0.054 0.004 1.00
Iraq AS IQ 32.10 25.00 25.60 7.40 3.60 2.70 2.70 0.90 0.911 0.567 0.517 0.092 0.003 1.00
Ireland EU IE 47.00 26.00 9.00 2.00 8.00 5.00 2.00 1.00 0.866 0.672 0.578 0.307 0.018 1.00
Israel AS IL 32.00 34.00 17.00 7.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 1.00 0.910 0.582 0.528 0.180 0.012 1.00
Italy EU IT 39.00 36.00 7.50 2.50 7.00 6.00 1.50 0.50 0.872 0.661 0.577 0.389 0.020 0.99
Ivory Coast AF CI 46.50 22.50 22.50 4.30 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.960 0.619 0.594 0.073 0.016 0.97
Japan AS JP 29.90 39.80 19.90 9.90 0.15 0.20 0.10 0.05 0.995 0.570 0.567 0.150 0.023 0.99
Kazakhstan AS KZ 30.70 29.80 24.20 8.30 2.30 2.20 1.80 0.70 0.935 0.560 0.524 0.085 0.014 0.98
Kenya AF KE 45.60 25.20 21.28 4.20 1.80 1.00 0.90 0.02 0.964 0.614 0.593 0.277 0.045 0.98
Luxembourg EU LU 35.00 37.00 9.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 2.00 1.00 0.872 0.637 0.555 0.207 0.022 0.97
Malaysia AS MY 34.32 30.35 27.37 7.46 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.995 0.563 0.560 0.220 0.018 0.96
Mexico SA MX 59.09 26.23 8.53 1.73 2.73 1.21 0.40 0.08 0.958 0.708 0.678 0.225 0.031 0.97
Moldova EU MD 28.50 31.80 17.60 7.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 1.10 0.872 0.574 0.501 0.168 0.008 0.99
Morocco AF MA 42.30 29.80 14.30 4.10 4.50 3.10 1.50 0.40 0.914 0.625 0.572 0.176 0.009 1.00
Nepal AS NP 35.20 28.30 27.10 8.60 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.992 0.567 0.562 0.135 0.025 0.96
Netherlands EU NL 39.50 35.00 6.70 2.50 7.50 7.00 1.30 0.50 0.864 0.669 0.577 0.439 0.036 0.99
Nigeria AF NG 51.30 22.40 20.70 2.60 1.60 0.70 0.60 0.10 0.971 0.640 0.622 0.155 0.020 0.92
Macedonia EU MK 30.00 34.00 15.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 1.00 0.872 0.588 0.512 0.224 0.034 0.97
Norway EU NO 33.20 41.60 6.80 3.40 5.80 7.40 1.20 0.60 0.873 0.661 0.576 0.304 0.047 0.96
Pakistan AS PK 26.63 21.60 34.40 9.52 2.17 1.66 3.57 0.45 0.928 0.557 0.518 0.075 0.005 0.99
Peru SA PE 70.00 18.40 7.80 1.60 1.40 0.50 0.28 0.02 0.978 0.761 0.744 0.385 0.021 0.99
Philippines AS PH 45.90 22.90 24.90 5.97 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.997 0.608 0.606 0.353 0.027 0.95
Poland EU PL 31.00 32.00 15.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 2.00 1.00 0.872 0.594 0.520 0.233 0.022 0.99
Portugal EU PT 36.20 39.80 6.60 2.90 6.10 6.80 1.10 0.50 0.876 0.666 0.583 0.389 0.035 0.99
Romania EU RO 28.00 36.50 13.60 6.80 5.00 6.50 2.40 1.20 0.872 0.594 0.518 0.184 0.009 0.99
Russian Federation EU RU 28.00 30.00 20.00 7.00 4.90 5.80 3.20 1.10 0.872 0.565 0.493 0.185 0.004 1.00
Saudi Arabia AS SA 47.80 23.90 17.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 1.00 0.30 0.932 0.638 0.595 0.190 0.037 0.96
Serbia EU RS 31.92 35.28 12.60 4.20 6.08 6.72 2.40 0.80 0.866 0.610 0.528 0.143 0.004 1.00
Singapore AS SG 44.70 23.90 24.50 5.60 0.60 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.987 0.604 0.596 0.178 0.066 0.98
South Africa AF ZA 39.00 32.00 12.00 3.00 6.00 5.00 2.00 1.00 0.880 0.629 0.551 0.208 0.024 0.98
South Korea AS KR 27.90 33.87 26.92 10.98 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.997 0.548 0.546 0.195 0.011 0.97
Spain EU ES 35.00 36.00 8.00 2.50 9.00 7.00 2.00 0.50 0.849 0.652 0.558 0.377 0.011 0.99
Sudan AF SD 48.00 27.70 15.20 2.80 3.50 1.80 0.80 0.20 0.941 0.642 0.605 0.110 0.003 1.00
Sweden EU SE 32.00 37.00 10.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 2.00 1.00 0.866 0.625 0.541 0.303 0.010 0.99
Switzerland EU CH 35.00 38.00 8.00 4.00 6.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 0.872 0.650 0.565 0.241 0.044 0.98
Thailand AS TH 40.80 16.90 36.80 4.97 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.03 0.995 0.605 0.602 0.270 0.006 0.99
Turkey AS TR 29.80 37.80 14.20 7.20 3.90 4.70 1.60 0.80 0.902 0.596 0.538 0.201 0.036 0.98
Ukraine EU UA 32.00 34.00 15.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 2.00 1.00 0.880 0.597 0.523 0.229 0.016 0.99
United Arab Emirates AS AE 44.10 21.90 20.90 4.30 4.30 2.10 2.00 0.40 0.920 0.618 0.569 0.135 0.007 0.98
United Kingdom EU BG 38.00 32.00 8.00 3.00 9.00 7.00 2.00 1.00 0.846 0.653 0.553 0.230 0.008 0.99
United States NA US 37.40 35.70 8.50 3.40 6.60 6.30 1.50 0.60 0.872 0.649 0.566 0.306 0.016 0.97
Venezuela SA VE 58.30 28.20 5.60 1.90 3.70 1.80 0.40 0.10 0.944 0.721 0.681 0.171 0.029 0.84
8with to, mo, m and A as free parameters. In this ex-
pression, A is a scaling factor and m represents the in-
verse of the characteristic time of the infection exponen-
tial growth, which is the quantity that we are looking
at. The linear term, observed at the very beginning of
the infection curve of different (not all) countries, can be
rationalized by assuming that at the very early stage of
the infection, people arrive from other countries, spread-
ing the virus before the real exponential growth appears.
The constant m0 is the “arrival rate” of infected people
(which is reasonable to assume constant in time), and we
do not expect any correlation between m and m0, be-
cause m is an intrinsic characteristic of the population,
and m0 only depend on the arrival from abroad. Besides
the specific meaning of the different parameters, our aim
is to derive the value of m, to compare this value with
the prediction of the model pi
(k)
T .
In Table IV, we report the values of m with its statis-
tical error ∆m as derived from the fit.
IV. RESULTS
In this section we compare the outcome of the model
with the available observational data (presented in the
previous section). Here model indicates the combination
of the generalized SIR (discussed in section II B) and the
infection rules hypothesized in [1].
A. Cases where infection data are stratified by
blood type
1. The Wuhan/Shenzhen case
As first discuss the three cases where the number of
infected people is stratified according to the blood type.
In two of them (Wuhan/Shenzhen and Turkey) the data
are available only for the ABO system, in the third one
(New York) the whole set of ABO×Rh types is known.
In the paper of Zhao et al. [18] the data of the Covid-19
contagion are reported, stratified by ABO blood type (no
info on the Rh± type are given). In particular, for each
of the three investigated hospitals, the authors provide
the frequencies of the ABO blood types of the local pop-
ulation, f¯ = (f0, fA, fB , fAB) (two of them are the same
as the hospitals are in the same city). The authors also
report the fraction of cases for each blood ABO type:
d¯ = (d0, dA, dB , dAB). These values are summarised in
table I.
As discussed before, the model predicts a linear rela-
tion between ln(di/fi) and p
(4)
i . In Fig. (3) we report a
plot of these two quantities. The different colors repre-
sent the different datasets. The black line is the result of
the least square fitting to all the data. Finally, the light
grey indicates the ± one standard deviation area.
The Pearson correlation coefficient for the N=12 data
points is 0.87. The corresponding p-value (0.0003) gives
Wuhan   1   (N = 1775)
Wuhan   2   (N = 113)
Shenzhen   (N = 285)
pi
(4)
FIG. 3: Ratio between frequencies of infected people for
each ABO group, di over frequency of the group on the
whole population, fi as measured in three hospitals of the
Wuhan/Shenzhen region [18] versus its theoretical prediction,
p
(4)
i obtained from Eq. (30) using the ABO set of rules and
the blood type frequencies in Table I. Black line represents
the best solution of a linear fit.
us confidence that the model is compatible with the ob-
servations.
2. The Ankara case
The same analysis carried out for the
Wuhan/Shenzhen case can be repeated using the
Turkish data collected by [31] in the region of Ankara
and reported in Table II. Figure 4 shows the logarithm
of the ratio between frequencies of infected people
for each ABO group, di over frequency of the group
on the healthy population, fi against the expected
susceptibility, p
(4)
i . Although affected by much higher
uncertainties with respect to the Chinese counterpart,
the behaviour is compatible with that in Figure 3. The
Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.34 (N=4, p-value
0.66). The low statistical reliability may be imputable
to both the low number of data points and their high
uncertainties. Combining the Wuhan/Shenzen dataset
with the Ankara one, we obtained an overall correlation
of 0.67 (N=16, p-value 0.004). We note that the AB
group seems to deviate from the trend, maybe due to
the low number of recorded cases for this group. If the
Turkish AB group is not considered in the analysis,
the correlation increases up to 0.88 (N=15, p-value
< 10−4), which is in agreement with the one found for
the Wuhan/Shenzhen case alone.
3. The New York case
The data collected by Zeitz et al. in New York
Presbyterian/Columbia University Irving Medical Center
9Ankara (N = 186)
FIG. 4: Ratio between frequencies of infected people for
each ABO groups, di over frequency of the group on the whole
population, fi as measured in a Turkish hospital in the region
of Ankara [31] versus its theoretical prediction, p
(4)
i obtained
from Eq. (30) using the ABO set of rules and the blood type
frequencies in Table II. Black line represents the best solution
of a linear fit.
(NYP/CUIMC) hospital [32] are stratified both accord-
ing to ABO and Rh± blood groups. This allows us to
test our working hypothesis for the ABO×Rh set of rules.
In Figure 5, the logarithm of the ratio between the num-
ber of infected for each group over the group frequency
of the local population (ln(di/fi)) is compared with the
8-group susceptibility, p
(8)
i computed according to Eq. 25
and using the data in Table III. The observational data
are in good accordance with the theoretical predictions.
It is worth emphasizing that the seemingly contradictory
behavior of negative Rh groups, and in particular of A-,
signaled by [32] is, on the contrary, well accounted for
by our model. Computing the Pearson coefficient in this
case yields a value of 0.56 with a p-value of 0.19.
Again, as already noted for the Turkish case, the AB
group appears to be an outlayer. Unfortunately, the col-
lected cases of infected with the AB group are too few
to guarantee statistical confidence on the ratio di/fi as
reported by [32]. If we do not consider the AB+ group
in the analysis (N=6), we observe a linear correlation of
0.93 with a p-value of 0.007.
B. Cases where infection data are not stratified by
blood type
1. Europe
The quantities pi
(k)
T represent the inverse of the charac-
teristic time of the infection (of the whole population) at
its onset. Therefore, they can be directly compared with
the quantities m previously discussed. Since the slopes
m are measured plotting the data as a function of the
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FIG. 5: Ratio between frequencies of infected people for
each ABO×Rh groups (except AB− one) , di over frequency
of the group on the whole population, fi as measured in New
York [32] versus its theoretical prediction, p
(8)
i obtained from
Eq. (30) using the ABO+Rh set of rules and the blood type
frequencies in Table III. Black line represents the best solution
of a linear fit.
real-time t, while pi
(k)
T are proportional to the scaled time
τ = βt, we expect the relation m = βpi
(k)
T = βp
(k)
T − γ.
Therefore, from a plot of m vs. p
(k)
T , we can both check
the validity of the model and extract the parameters β
and γ.
At first, we compared the m found for the 29 coun-
tries of the European area with the corresponding p
(k)
T s
computed starting from the frequencies of the different
blood types found in each country and reported in Ta-
ble IV. While a contagion scheme based only on the
Rhesus group rules (p
(2)
T ) does not explain the observed
trends of the epidemics, a high Pearson correlation (0.71)
is present between data and model predictions when con-
tagions are driven by the ABO group rules (p
(4)
T ). Indeed,
as shown in Figure 6, countries with higher susceptibility
also present, on average, a higher m value. A linear fit
of the data allows us to extract the overall values of in-
fection (β) and recovery (γ) rates that if combined yield
a value of R0 of ∼ 2 in excellent agreement with the cur-
rent estimates of reproduction number in the early stages
of the outbreak [35].
We note that points tend to form two clusters. In-
terestingly, retrieving the geographic information, we see
a clear east-to-west gradient of the susceptibility, which
drives back to the different geographical distribution of
the ABH phenotypes [36]. Figure 7 clearly shows at a
glance this trend for the four-group susceptibility, p
(4)
T .
The addition of the Rhesus information to the ABO
scheme (p
(8)
T ) produces a negligible increase of the corre-
lation, while rates remain compatible with those found
for p
(4)
T case. To test the obtained linear trends, we
performed an F-test assuming a constant slope as null-
hypothesis.
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FIG. 6: Inverse characteristic time of the epidemic exponen-
tial phase extracted from cumulative infection curves, m, vs
theoretical prediction, p
(4)
T obtained from Eq. (28) using the
ABO set of rules and the blood type frequencies in Table IV.
Each dot corresponds to one of the 29 analyzed countries in
the European region named according to the 2-letter ISO code
and reported in Table IV. The black line represents the best
solution of a linear fit performed with the York method and
the grey shaded area is the ± one standard deviation confi-
dence band.
In Table V, p-values for both the Pearson coefficient
and F-statistic are reported. Note that the significance of
p
(2)
T is just an artifact of the data disposition, which tend
to cluster around the values of p
(2)
T = 0.87, thus yielding
a high slope. Reversing the axis and repeating the linear
fit, one obtains a value of F of 1.28 which has a p-value
above the threshold.
2. Asia
Repeating the same analyses carried out for European
countries with those in the Asia region, we found an over-
all similar trend, where the major difference lies in the
contribution of the Rhesus group. In particular, both p
(2)
T
and p
(4)
T values present a non-random linear correlation
with the inverse characteristic times, m, of 0.54 and 0.45,
respectively. The corresponding p-values are below the
threshold of 0.05 for the 21 Asiatic countries. Interest-
ingly, combining the ABO and Rh rules, the accordance
between the observed trend and the theoretical predic-
tions increases up to a correlation value of 0.74, quite
similar to the European one. The infection and recov-
ering rates obtained thought a linear fit of the data, are
slightly higher than those found ruling the infection in
Europe although their ration gives an almost equal R0.
Testing the linear fits with the F-test, we can reject
the null hypothesis for all three cases, with the usual
0.58
0.60
0.62
0.64
0.66
FIG. 7: Map representation of European countries. Each
country is colored according to its p
(4)
T susceptibility value
obtained from Eq. (28) using the ABO set of rules and the
blood type frequencies reported in Table IV. p
(4)
T values in-
crease going from blue to red. Gray countries have not been
considered due to a lack of either blood or infection informa-
tion. The map shows large variability in the susceptibility
p
(4)
T (that ranges from 0.56 to 0.68) and a clear east-to-west
gradient. The increase of susceptibility going west is a direct
consequence of the tendency of increase of the 0 blood type in
this direction: the more one blood type dominates, the higher
is the susceptibility.
threshold level of 0.05. All results are again summarized
in Table V.
3. South America and Africa
Finally, we consider two other distinct regions, i.e.
South America and Africa, both characterized by a still
exponentially proliferating infection. The former exhibits
a trend similar to the Europe one, characterized by an un-
substantial contribution of the Rhesus group rules, while
a correlation of 0.62 is present between the m coming
from the fitting of the infection curves and p
(4)
T . The in-
fection and recovering rates obtained by a linear fit are
both smaller than those found in the Eurasian region.
However, they combine to give a value of R0 of ∼ 2.
Both the p-value of the Pearson correlation and that an
F-test on the linear fit are below the significance thresh-
old of 0.05 for all set of rules except for p
(2)
T one. Results
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FIG. 8: Inverse characteristic time of the epidemic exponen-
tial phase extracted from cumulative infection curves, m vs
theoretical prediction, p
(8)
T obtained from Eq. (28) combining
the ABO and Rh± sets of rules and using the blood type
frequencies in Table IV. Each dot corresponds to one of the
21 analysed countries in the Asiatic region named according
to the 2-letter ISO code and reported in Table IV. Black line
represents the best solution of a linear fit.
for the African region instead show no meaningful corre-
lation. As it is the slope of the best linear fit which does
not pass an F-test with zero slope as a null hypothesis.
4. Final comments on the countries cases
Overall, we found a statistically significant correlation
among the m and p
(k)
T (k = 4, 8) data for Europe, Asia,
and South Americas, taken individually. The reason for
analyzing separately these continents lies in the fact that
we expect that beside blood type distribution other fac-
tors affect the infectivity onset and initial growth rate.
The lifestyle and the local climate are certainly some of
them. We have therefore considered countries aggrega-
tions that preserve at the best these two aspects. To
check this hypothesis, we have analyzed (see Table VI)
what is the effect of adding North America and/or Aus-
tralia to the European countries. As can be seen in Ta-
ble VI, the Pearson correlation does not change signifi-
cantly in these cases. A rather worst result is obtained
by considering Asia and Europe together, although the
Pearson correlation still maintains a high degree of sta-
tistical significance (p-value better than 10−4 ). The cor-
relation becomes even worst when considering the whole
world (Pearson 0.43) but also in this case there is a great
advantage (p-value better than 10−3) with respect to the
null hypothesis (no-correlation between m and p
(k)
T ). We
conclude that the model presented here is compatible
with the existing data.
As far as the effect of temperature, humidity, etc. it is
tempting to speculate on the obtained results: i) Europe
and Asia share a good correlation, as well as the values of
β and γ; ii) South America has again a good correlation,
but its β and γ are smaller than in Europe and Asia; iii)
Africa shows a bad correlation. These three points could
be rationalized remembering that, at the pandemic onset
Europe and Asia were in their wintertime, South America
in the summertime, while African countries experienced
different climate situations.
V. DISCUSSION
Most of the proteins that decorate cell membranes are
bound to glycans [37]. The presence of those carbohy-
drate chains provides a further channel of interaction be-
tween proteins, besides the usual direct protein-protein
one, and evolved to play a large array of life-sustaining
functions including support, signaling, protein folding,
and protection.
It has been suggested that protection against
pathogens was the driving force that favored the evolu-
tion of the complex landscape of glycan interactions (see
e.g. [38] for a more detailed discussion).
Since viruses do not have genes for glycan synthesis
or modification, they inherit host cell glycans after each
round of replication in a new host. This means that the
host cell in which the virus last replicated generated the
glycans on viral glycoproteins [38].
A mutation in the host population having as an out-
come the loss of a glycan modification could then provide
a selective advantage to the glycan-lacking subpopula-
tion. In fact, pathogens using that glycan as a receptor
would not be able to invade the host cells anymore. More-
over, the host can develop specific antibodies against the
abolished glycan [39].
Human blood groups constitute an important example.
Individuals having O blood group lack of A or B antigens
and when presented with glycan motifs similar to either A
or B antigens, they develop anti-A and anti-B antibodies.
Individuals with A or B blood group develop either anti-
B or anti-A antibodies, respectively. On the other hand,
people with subgroup AB lack such antibodies.
According to those ‘rules’, in case of an infection, one
would expect that looking at the blood type of the people
found infected by the virus, group O should be under-
represented with respect to its occurrence in the whole
population. This feature has been indeed observed by
Zhao and coworkers [18] for the COVID-19 outbreak,
caused by the novel SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. Notably,
a similar behavior was found in the hospital outbreak of
SARS in Hong Kong in 2003 [40]. Moreover, both SARS-
CoV and SARS-CoV-2 S protein trimers are covered
by an extensive glycan shield, surrounding the receptor-
binding domain and can infect cells that express ABH
antigens according to the individual phenotype [41, 42].
Importantly, the dilution effect on the contagion due to
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TABLE V: Main results for the different countries aggregation.
Continent β γ ρ Pearson p-value F p-value
Europe (EU) p
(2)
T -35.39 -31.01 - -0.26 0.17 22.4 < 10
−4
(29 countries) p
(4)
T 2.31 1.20 0.52 0.71 < 10
−4 42.5 < 10−4
p
(8)
T 3.36 1.57 0.48 0.71 < 10
−3 34.2 < 10−4
Asia (AS) p
(2)
T 2.06 1.80 - 0.54 0.01 19.5 < 10
−3
(21 countries) p
(4)
T 4.42 2.38 0.54 0.45 0.04 1.3 0.05
p
(8)
T 3.02 1.49 0.49 0.74 < 10
−3 39.2 < 10−4
South America (SA) p
(2)
T -0.46 -0.62 - 0.29 0.34 0.79 0.39
(13 countries) p
(4)
T 1.24 0.67 0.54 0.62 0.02 8.1 0.02
p
(8)
T 1.13 0.55 0.49 0.58 0.04 6.7 0.03
Africa (AF) p
(2)
T 0.37 0.25 0.74 -0.09 0.78 0.5 0.5
(12 countries) p
(4)
T 0.52 0.22 0.42 -0.07 0.82 1.2 0.3
p
(8)
T 0.38 0.11 0.29 0.01 0.97 1.2 0.3
TABLE VI: Pearson correlations between m and p
(k)
T (k =
4, 8) for different continent aggregations.
Aggregation Countries p
(k)
T Pearson p-value
Europe and North America 31 p
(4)
T 0.70 < 10
−4
p
(8)
T 0.70 < 10
−4
Europe and Australia 30 p
(4)
T 0.69 < 10
−4
p
(8)
T 0.70 < 10
−4
Europe and Asia 50 p
(4)
T 0.62 < 10
−4
p
(8)
T 0.58 < 10
−4
Temperate (North) 48 p
(4)
T 0.63 < 10
−4
p
(8)
T 0.51 < 10
−3
Tropical 26 p
(4)
T 0.24 0.24
p
(8)
T 0.31 0.12
Temperate (Sud) 4 p
(4)
T 0.97 0.03
p
(8)
T 0.94 0.06
World 78 p
(4)
T 0.43 < 10
−3
p
(8)
T 0.34 0.002
the asymmetrical transmissions must be reflected in the
growth of the epidemics. In the present work, we have
studied how the existence of asymmetrical virus trans-
missions affect such growth.
To this aim, we expanded the usual SIR formalism to
take into consideration the possible effect of blood anti-
genicity in the COVID-19 transmission, which closely re-
sembles that of blood transfusions. To solve the set of
generalized SIR Equations (16)-(18) for any time, one
has to rely on numerics, however, we provided analyti-
cal solutions in the small-time limit, where the epidemics
is in its exponential-growing regime. In particular, we
obtained an expression linking the inverse characteristic
time of the exponential phase with the abundances of the
different blood groups in the population. We propose a
set of susceptibility indices: p
(k)
i for the sub-population
i and p
(k)
T for the total population. Here k=2 accounts
for only the Rh± system, k=4 for the AB0 system, and
k=8 for the AB0×Rh± one. The model predicts a linear
dependence of the observed epidemic inverse timescale m
with the total susceptibility.
To test the model, we first compare its predictions with
the experimental data provided in [18], where the blood
type of infected people of two Chinese regions was col-
lected. Comparing the population frequencies of blood
groups with those found in the infected sub-population,
we verified that the proposed contagion scheme well de-
scribes the observed frequencies, since the difference ob-
served between the ABO blood type population distribu-
tion and the ABO blood type infected people distribution
supports the validity of the infection scheme proposed in
[1]. A similar approach has been used to test the model
for two further cases (Ankara [31] and New York [32])
where data are available, although with a much lower
statistic. Albeit the low statistical confidence of the pro-
vided data, both cases seem in qualitative agreement with
the model prediction.
Unfortunately, besides the data analyzed in [18, 31,
32], which are restricted to the Wuhan/Shenzhen, New
York, and Ankara regions, respectively, no large-scale
data are available about the distribution on the blood
type of infected people.
Then we analyzed the infection curves of a large set of
countries worldwide, comparing the characteristic time of
the infection outbreak with the prediction of our model
based on the known blood group distribution for each
country. This allows us to discard possible bias due to
data collection and geographical factors. Note that in
this second case, we do not have the information about
the blood groups of the infected population but only on
the whole population. Thus, we can compare the growth
rate in the short time, exponential, phase with the “sus-
ceptibility” p
(k)
T proposed by the model.
We managed to collect data on the blood frequencies
and the infections for 78 different countries belonging to a
well distinct geographical area, i.e. Europe, Asia, South
America, and Africa. Since we expect that differences
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both geographical and on the lifestyles affect the infec-
tion and recovering rates we kept the countries separated
according to the four identified areas.
Rhesus blood types have a marked effect in the Asiatic
countries, which are characterized by a broad distribution
of p
(2)
T . On the other hand, Europe and South America
present a narrower distribution. Anyhow, the correlation
measured using the k=2 susceptibility turns out to be
always not significant. As far as the k=4 and k=8 case,
three out of the four areas present a very good agreement
between data and model prediction (see Table V). The
k=8 case is better than k=4 in Asia, while no substantial
difference is found in Europe and South America (mainly
because of the lower abundance of Rh− with respect to
Asia). Summing up, it seems that the best agreement
between data and model is found fro k=8: both AB0
and Rh± blood type have an effect on the virus spreading
pattern.
In a nutshell, we proposed a generalized SIR model
with infection rules dictated by antigenicity between dif-
ferent blood types. Obtaining an analytical solution of
the model for the exponential phase, we were able to pro-
vide a rigorous theoretical test of the hypothesis proposed
in [1]. We have made the test both for local data, where
the number of infected people is stratified by blood type,
and, on a wider scale, analyzing the infection growth
curves of 78 counties worldwide. Overall, the present
study reaches the conclusion that the hypothesis of a
blood type effect on the COVID-19 advanced in [1] it
is not falsified by the available observational epidemic
data.
Obviously, to strengthen the validation of the hypoth-
esis in [1] a direct detection of the antigens linked to
the SARS-CoV-2 is needed, but this goes far beyond the
goals of the present paper.
As a final note, we observe that, besides blood types,
other population dependent antigens distribution could
play a role in the geographically heterogeneous infection
spreading [43].
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